This movie serves an important function by detailing the early mistakes made in Iraq once the US went in. Charles Ferguson, a computer entrepreneur and journalist-nearly a public intellectual....if the public actually knew about him...helms his first film with this movie. Ferguson recognizes, as reflected by the title of his movie, that this war is irreparably lost. Whether people wish to assert otherwise is beside the point. This is not a political point or a demagogic point, but our soldiers and our mission are incidental at this point.
If one takes that as a starting point, the important thing that Ferguson should do, is examine HOW things got the way they are. He takes that as his mission and focuses primarily on key decisions made during the first year and three months of the war and their irreversible effect on the direction the war would go. He highlights three key decisions which he claims (and I think quite correctly) ensured that the US effort would be in vain. He also cites some experts who believe that had better decisions been made that the US occupation might have been more organized. I don't know about that. I think reasonable people can disagree about that and that is a topic for study somewhere else, but regardless, his points that the de- Ba'athification of the civil service in Iraq-meaning that many lower level civil servants who may have signed up with the Ba'ath party in order to avoid Saddam's wrath, largely middle- class "technocrats" as Ferguson appropriately terms them, I think-was an unexpected boon to resistance toward the US' presence in Iraq, that the dissolution of the Iraqi army-which suddenly put 150,000 Iraqi men out of work and made them susceptible to the overtures of those resisting the US, and other decisions which ensured the alienation and impoverishment of Iraqi families, were the greatest mistakes made by the US occupation government in Iraq.
Ferguson engages many figures who had key roles in the burgeoning occupation, including former diplomat Barbara Bodine, who was fired after she made clear that she thought that Iraqis should have a stronger voice in the reconstruction of their country, Jay Garner, the first head of the US who the Cheney administration found would not be a usable toy, and interestingly, Richard Armitage who seems thoughtful but admits that while he doubted the Cheney administrations claims that 150,000 troops would be sufficient to manage Iraq, did not publicly challenge these claims.
Also squirming in his seat is Walter Slocombe who was the Senior Adviser for National Security and was instrumental in offering advice about the direction of the US' role in Iraq. He seems very squirrelly when attempting not to admit blame, while also being honest, about whether or not he was comfortable with the de-commissioning of the Iraqi army and the rather unilateral leadership of Paul Bremer. Credit to him for being interviewed on camera (which Condoleeza Rice, Paul Bremer, and Donald Rumsfeld refused to do in this project), but his awkwardness and terseness spoke volumes about his role in facilitating, or at least not speaking out against, the increasingly out-of-touch leadership of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer. Very insightful too are Paul Hughes, the man in charge of training Iraqi troops in 2003 and 2004, whose pain and confusion are writ clear when he speaks of Iraqi soldiers asking him why the Iraqi army had been disbanded. His forthrightness and reserve also seem to speak to his reluctance to criticize government leaders. However, his account of his experiences and the comments of former Iraqi soldiers to him, make clear his feelings. Jay Garner's bluntness seem to make clear the reasons why the Bush administration would have been uneasy with his presence in Iraq. He comes across as blunt and not suave, but as a man whose greatest interest was the clearest transfer of power to Iraqis and a clear and reasonable role for Americans. Another compelling figure is Robert Hutchings, the head of the National Intelligence Committee which devoted much time to handicapping the future prospects in Iraq in late 2004 and offered a dire forecast, particularly if the US did not change course, only to have Monkey Boy dismiss their findings in his own inimitable manner, as saying that some things were going well, and others were not. An entire NIE, which Hutchings confirms the President did not read, and the President dismisses it by summarizing its findings so simply. He offers no more comment, and indeed, by his tone and his demeanor, no more is needed. That NIE was dismissed by Cheney and Rumsfeld as nay-saying and unwarranted negativity.
The movie is spare and cool. Ferguson declines to focus on the chaos and disaster which have characterized much of the last 2.75 or 3 years but instead, focuses tightly and accordingly, searingly, on the early days of the war, when the White House showed its hand toward its course in Iraq. It is a bracing, clear-headed indictment of some early mistakes made by the Cheney administration which seem to have doomed, from the earliest stages, the US mission there. Everyone should see this movie.
If one takes that as a starting point, the important thing that Ferguson should do, is examine HOW things got the way they are. He takes that as his mission and focuses primarily on key decisions made during the first year and three months of the war and their irreversible effect on the direction the war would go. He highlights three key decisions which he claims (and I think quite correctly) ensured that the US effort would be in vain. He also cites some experts who believe that had better decisions been made that the US occupation might have been more organized. I don't know about that. I think reasonable people can disagree about that and that is a topic for study somewhere else, but regardless, his points that the de- Ba'athification of the civil service in Iraq-meaning that many lower level civil servants who may have signed up with the Ba'ath party in order to avoid Saddam's wrath, largely middle- class "technocrats" as Ferguson appropriately terms them, I think-was an unexpected boon to resistance toward the US' presence in Iraq, that the dissolution of the Iraqi army-which suddenly put 150,000 Iraqi men out of work and made them susceptible to the overtures of those resisting the US, and other decisions which ensured the alienation and impoverishment of Iraqi families, were the greatest mistakes made by the US occupation government in Iraq.
Ferguson engages many figures who had key roles in the burgeoning occupation, including former diplomat Barbara Bodine, who was fired after she made clear that she thought that Iraqis should have a stronger voice in the reconstruction of their country, Jay Garner, the first head of the US who the Cheney administration found would not be a usable toy, and interestingly, Richard Armitage who seems thoughtful but admits that while he doubted the Cheney administrations claims that 150,000 troops would be sufficient to manage Iraq, did not publicly challenge these claims.
Also squirming in his seat is Walter Slocombe who was the Senior Adviser for National Security and was instrumental in offering advice about the direction of the US' role in Iraq. He seems very squirrelly when attempting not to admit blame, while also being honest, about whether or not he was comfortable with the de-commissioning of the Iraqi army and the rather unilateral leadership of Paul Bremer. Credit to him for being interviewed on camera (which Condoleeza Rice, Paul Bremer, and Donald Rumsfeld refused to do in this project), but his awkwardness and terseness spoke volumes about his role in facilitating, or at least not speaking out against, the increasingly out-of-touch leadership of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer. Very insightful too are Paul Hughes, the man in charge of training Iraqi troops in 2003 and 2004, whose pain and confusion are writ clear when he speaks of Iraqi soldiers asking him why the Iraqi army had been disbanded. His forthrightness and reserve also seem to speak to his reluctance to criticize government leaders. However, his account of his experiences and the comments of former Iraqi soldiers to him, make clear his feelings. Jay Garner's bluntness seem to make clear the reasons why the Bush administration would have been uneasy with his presence in Iraq. He comes across as blunt and not suave, but as a man whose greatest interest was the clearest transfer of power to Iraqis and a clear and reasonable role for Americans. Another compelling figure is Robert Hutchings, the head of the National Intelligence Committee which devoted much time to handicapping the future prospects in Iraq in late 2004 and offered a dire forecast, particularly if the US did not change course, only to have Monkey Boy dismiss their findings in his own inimitable manner, as saying that some things were going well, and others were not. An entire NIE, which Hutchings confirms the President did not read, and the President dismisses it by summarizing its findings so simply. He offers no more comment, and indeed, by his tone and his demeanor, no more is needed. That NIE was dismissed by Cheney and Rumsfeld as nay-saying and unwarranted negativity.
The movie is spare and cool. Ferguson declines to focus on the chaos and disaster which have characterized much of the last 2.75 or 3 years but instead, focuses tightly and accordingly, searingly, on the early days of the war, when the White House showed its hand toward its course in Iraq. It is a bracing, clear-headed indictment of some early mistakes made by the Cheney administration which seem to have doomed, from the earliest stages, the US mission there. Everyone should see this movie.